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ABSTRACT 
China's economy takes off since the adoption of domestic reform and open door 
policy. As foreign investment takes a critical role in the economic reform in China, 
how does the Chinese government reform its legal system so as to attract overseas 
capital and to monitor foreign investment in the country? What are the roles of the 
legal regime in the attraction and utilization of foreign investment? This study takes 
an institutional approach to these issues by focusing on how the formal institutional 
changes in the legal system induce changes in the informal institution, the legal 
organization, and their effect on the economic development in China. 
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Since the open door policy was determined in the Eleventh CPC Central Committee 
in 1978，the economy of China has grown in a dramatic pace. Between 1980 and 
1989, China's GDP grew in an average of 9.3% per year; from 1990 to 1996，the 
average growth rate reached 10.1%. These achievements come hand in hand with an 
increase in foreign investment in China. Between 1992 and 1995, US$109.8 billion of 
foreign capital were injected in China, seconded after the United States. Foreign-
. invested assets represented 16.1% of the total fixed assets in China in 1995 - a driving 
force of the nation's economic growth. 
During the course of economic development, Chinese legal system has undergone 
huge changes. Laws, regulations, circulars, decisions and all kinds of published and 
unpublished legal document mushroom in all levels of the legal regime. Westem legal 
concepts, which were alien to the Chinese culture, have been introduced to the 
country. These include concepts like intellectual property rights, labor law and BOT, 
many ofwhich are mere terms to most Chinese. Changes within the legal organization 
also take place. Local and provincial governments are granted the authority to enact 
laws, subject to limitation. Though at a slower pace, informal institution meaning the 
social values and norms are changing. 
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According to the school of Law and Development, there is a close relationship 
between development and legal system. As Stone, Levy and Parades (1993) put it, 
rapid market-based economic growth depends on a “system of simple, transparent 
laws and regulation; consistent interpretation and environment (like cases are treated 
alike); just and rapid resolution of conflicts Qustice deferred is justice denied); and a 
social attitude of respect for legal and regulation institutions.，，The Common Law 
system of England, the United States and the westem European countries are 
considered as the ideal. Deviation from the ideal obstructs development. For example, 
informal sector unprotected by law rose in Peru as Peruvian law is burdened with a 
system that provides disincentive to formality. 
Putting the concept to the context of China, is China's legal and institutional 
/ framework sufficient in helping the government to implement its policies of economic 
reform? What are the roles ofChina's legal system in the use and attraction of foreign 
investment? In the economics of institution, how does the reform in the formal 
institution (the legal system) affect the informal institution (social values and norms), 
the legal organization, and the economic performance of China? 
This paper will begin with a brief discussion of the reform in China's legal system in 
the context of foreign investment. Stages of the reform in relation to the purposes of 
the central government and the outcomes will be examined. It will then briefly discuss 
the legal structure, i.e. lawmaking and hierarchy oflegislative authority. 
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Then, we will analyze the roles of the legal system in relation to foreign investment. 
There are several critical functions of the legal system. First, the PRC government 
uses legislation as a mean to institutionalize economic reform. Second, in creating a 
suitable investment environment for overseas investors, the government legislates to 
protect the property rights ofthe investors. By 'property rights', we do not refer to the 
legal term of physical right of a property, but the economic term that refers to the 
rights of an actor to use valuable assets under both formal rules and in social norms 
and customs (Eggertsson 1993). The definition of property rights according to 
Chinese legislation will be considered later in this paper. 
The Chinese government tries hard to reduce transaction costs of doing business in 
the country. Although there are still many complaints about the opaque and 
inconsistent legal structure in China, lots of works have been done by the legislative 
- entities to specify contract terms and approval procedure. 
Reform of the legal system leads to changes within the legal organization and the 
informal institutions. According to the economics ofinstitution, institutional change is 
a dynamic model that involves the active interaction among institutions, organizations 
and economic performance of a society. 
Despite the government's effort in perfecting the legal system, there are still 
complaints by foreign investors, mainly concem about the lack of transparency and 
consistency, and enforceability of law and contracts. By examining the legal risks 
exposed to foreign investors, we try to analyze the key problems China faces in 
establishing a legal order. The risks perceived by foreign investors are key factors 
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affecting investment and lending decisions, which in tum affect the economic 




REFORM OF LEGAL SYSTEM 
The Law ofthe People's Republic of China on Chinese-Foreign Equity Joint Ventures 
(the "JV Law") promulgated in 1979 was the first act by which the PRC government 
showed its determination in providing a suitable investment environment for foreign 
investors. Although the JV Law has only 15 articles, it sets the layout of the form, 
legal status, equity injection and the rights and obligations of the equityjoint ventures 
parties that are to be followed in the future. 
Since then, laws, resolutions, 'decisions', rules and measures began to mushroom 
from all levels of the legal regime. Between 1979 and 1994, the National People's 
Congress ("NPC") and its Standing Committee had passed basic laws and resolutions 
at a rate of 21 units per year (Zheng 1994). Li 1982, the policy of economic reform 
and the introduction of foreign investment were written down in the Constitution of 
the People's Republic of China, giving it a status of supreme authority. Through 
lawmaking, the Chinese Communist Party institutionalizes economic reform. 
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Stages of legal reform 
1. The initial stage, 1979-1986 
The JV Law that passed by the NPC in July 1979 was the first law regarding foreign 
investment. Preferential policies for four special economic zones along the coastal 
line in southern China were approved to attract foreign investment. However, due to 
government's insufficient preparation in all areas, foreign investors hesitated and 
level of foreign investments was low during the early years of economic reform. 
Jn 1983, the State Council summarized China's initial experience in the attraction of 
foreign capital and determined to open fourteen more coastal cities as special 
economic zones. More preferential policies were implemented. It was not until 1985 
when the Law on Economic Contracts Involving Foreign Interest was promulgated 
and more specific measures such as decentralization of approval authority, offering of 
tax deductions and market share were issued, that foreign investments took off. The 
Law on Economic Contract specifies the conditions, fulfillment, breach, transfer and 
termination of a legal contract. As a result of a clearer legal definition of business 
contract, amount of foreign contracts signed in 1985 more than doubled that in 1984 
(Exhibit 1). 
One milestone project was Shajiao B power station invested in 1985 by the Hong 
Kong-listed Hopewell Holdings Limited, founded and managed by Gordon Wu. The 
700MW power generation project is located in Shajiao, Guangdong with a total 
project cost of HK$4 billion 0^S$513 million). Financing of the project received 
enthusiastic responses from banks that a gearing ratio of 11 times was achieved. 
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Exhibit 1. Foreign Direct Investment in China 1979 to 1995 
y ^ Number of Value of Value ofForeign 
Contracts Contracts Signed Capital Used 
(US$ mio) (US$ mio) 
1979-1982 922 4,608 1,771 
T9S3 470 T,731 “ 916 
T984 r,856 "2,650 1,419 
T985 • : : _j^ y3—~ 5,931 • 1,956 
T986 i"4^8""" 2,834 “ 2,245 — 
„ _ 2 j 3 3 — 3,709 2,647 
T 9 ^ 5,945~~~ 5097~~ 3,740 
T98^ 57f79~~ 5,600 —— 3,774 
J990 7,Tf3""""".. 6,596 —— 3,410 
'~m~l j ^ j — 11,980 — 4,366 
l992 ^ 4 ¾ ; ? ^ 5 ^ 1 2 2 1 1 , 0 0 8 
"i993 83737" U T ^ ~ " " " " " 27,515 
T994 "47^4% 81,406 33,767 
T995 "3"7;;011 91,282 37,521 
1979-1986 7,819 17,754 8,307 
"f987lWi ^ W 33,182 17,937 
W2"T995 2l6,702 "342 ,246 109,811 
Total 248,729 393,182 136,055 
Source: PRC Year Book 1996/97 
2. Steady development stage, 1987-1991 
A series of studies on the usage of foreign capital in the country was conducted in 
1986 and the Chinese government concluded that actions had to be taken to attract 
more overseas funds and advanced technology. Li 1986，the Regulations on 
Encouraging Foreign Investment (generally known as the '22 Articles") was issued by 
the State Council to grant preferential treatments to production enterprises and to 
encourage the introduction of advanced technology and export sales. Jn 1988，the 
State Council promulgated the Program for the Near-Term Reform of the Livestment 
Management System. The Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange were set up. 
As a result, the period between 1987 and 1991 was marked by an increase in the 
number of foreign-invested manufacturing enterprises, production facilities that used 
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higher level of technology and increased export sales. Value of foreign contracts 
signed rose 87% over the initial period and amount of actual foreign capital used 
doubled. 
This period was also marked by the amendments of the Constitution of the People 
Republic ofChina in 1988. For the first time，the PRC government formally approved 
private investment in the country. The permission of leasing and transfer of land use 
rights tumed the green light oflong-term project developments in China. 
Another important breakthrough in China's legal system was the passing of the PRC 
Cooperative Joint Venture Law in 1988. Prior to this, although cooperative joint 
ventures ("CJV") accounted for more than 50% of total foreign investment in China 
(Zheng 1994), this form ofFDI had no legal status. The Cooperative Joint Venture 
Law sets out the role and regulations in the establishment of CJV. 
3. Fast growing period, 1992- the present 
Since Deng Xiao-ping's famous tour of the southern China in 1992, there was an 
upsurge of foreign investment throughout the country. Foreign investments have 
moved and expanded from labor-intensive industries along the coastal line to 
infrastructure and capitaVtechnology-intensive industries in the inland. Between 1992 
and 1995, value of contracts signed averaged US$85.5 billion per year, representing 
1.7 times the sum ofthe past 13 years since the economic reform has taken place. 
Since then, the reform of China's foreign investment system enters into the third 
stage. A series of measures and laws are issued. These include the trial 
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implementation of a capital fund system for fixed assets investment projects, and 
some provisions, circulars and laws with respect to infrastructure investment-related 
issues including laws on power plant, highway, project finance and the build-operate-
transfer ("BOT") structure. The State Development Bank was established to separate 
policy-based banking from commercial banking. All these, according to Li Rongrong, 
the Vice-Minister of the State Development Planning Commission, is “to form an 
investment regulatory mechanism with the state industrial policies at its core and 
control over the capital sources as principal means" (1998). 
Legal framework 
China's legislation comprises (1) constitutional provisions, basic laws and resolutions 
enacted by the NPC and its Standing Committee; (2) administrative regulations by 
State Council and its departments; and (3) local administrative regulations and rules, 
I 
legal explanations and treaty norms by provincial people's congresses and local 
governments. The Constitution of the PRC is the principal law of China. It was 
enacted in 1982 after three preliminary constitutions in 1954, 1975 and 1978, and was 
revised later in 1988 and 1993 that resulted in 11 amendments. Legislation adopted by 
the NPC is superior to any other legislative and administrative authorities in the 
government. 
1. Lawmaking principles 
In China, the fundamental principle of its legal system is to protect state interests. 
Legislation and legal regime surrounding the foreign investment environment are no 
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exception. Respect state autonomy and obey to Chinese law are basic principles for 
foreigners doing business in China. 
Another principle of foreign investment laws is to maintain mutual benefit for both 
Chinese and foreign parties. Sino-foreign agreements, contracts and memorandums 
should be construed on a fair basis and attended to the benefits ofboth parties. 
Foreign investors and enterprises will enjoy the same protection from the Chinese 
government as Chinese citizens and enterprises do. The legal status, rights and 
obligations for overseas investors and Chinese investors will be the same. 
2. Hierarchy oflegislative authority 
Li China, basic law and general guidelines are issued by the central government. The 
laws are expressed in terms of standards and real clarity exists at the level of 
administrative rules and circulars. These rules and circulars are usually issued by 
administrative bodies and by local government authorities with modifications to 
adjust to local conditions. 
According to the Constitution, the central law-making institutions include NPC and its 
Standing Committee, the President of the PRC, the State Council and its commissions 
and ministries, Central Military Committee, the Supreme People's Court and the 
Supreme People's Prosecutor. The Organic Law on Local Congress and Local 
Government of China permitted the local governments to enact laws suitable for local 
conditions, provided that they do not contravene the Constitution of the PRC, basic 
laws and policies of the central government. 
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Provisional measures can also be issued by some local governments. Seven cities are 
delegated the authority to promulgate local provisions and they are Shanghai, Tianjin, 
Guangzhou, Fuzhou, Dalian, Qingdao and Linbo. In fact, several national provisions 
are introduced in these cities first and then applied to the whole country. 
As a result, there are many formal and informal, published or unpublished legislation 
and legal normative documents. While this system allows for flexibility and 
adjustments on a case by case basis, it induces conflicts and overlapping oflaws. 
Although the NPC is the supreme authority of China, it has no right to explain its own 
enactment. It is the responsibility of the Standing Committee and the Supreme 
People's Court to interpret laws as empowered by the Constitution. This creates 
potential conflict between the NPC and the Standing Committee. The hierarchy of 
lawmaking in China is summarized in the following chart. 
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Exhibit 2: Hierarchy of Formal and Informal Lawmaking 
"' NPC basic laws, resolutions, decisions 
"i^f>"^;rSik-iiiSii^ <5ommittee laws, resolutions, decisions 
Supreme 
State Council regulations, other normative documents People's 
Court: 
Ministries, Commissions and rules, other normative documents Interpretation 
Bureaus 
~ L ^ a l People's Congresses with local administrative regulations 
lawmaking power (municipal, 
provincial, provincial capital, ‘quite 
big city’） 
Local people's governments with local administrative rules, other normative 
lawmaking power (municipal, documents 
provincial, provincial capital, 'quite 
big city，） 
Local people's congresses and other normative documents 
governments without lawmaking 
，j power 
Source: Come 1997 
Features oflegal system 
When pushing through legal reform, the Chinese government encounters many 
problems. First, China is inexperience in the introduction of foreign capital and it 
lacks a stable and well-developed legal system and regime to conduct a whole-hearted 
reform to support business transactions and to improve the business environment for 
foreign investors. Second, by adopting western economic model, China imports some 
westem legal concepts which have no root in Chinese society and diverse from 
Chinese social norms. Third, China is a big country and there are huge variations in 
different parts of the country. China does not have an efficient government framework 
to enable effective implementation and supervision of laws. 
In order to tackle these problems, China adopts several strategies: 
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1. Use of administrative law 
Administrative law forms a vital part of the Chinese legal system (Come 1997). Most 
laws in China can be categorized as public law as they are designed to regulate 
behavior ofthe society, politics and the economy. In essence, laws relating to foreign 
investment are part of the wider area of administrative law that the state used to 
regulate foreign investment activities. 
2. Provisional measures first, laws then follow 
It is the typical approach for the Chinese government to launch provisional measures 
to test the market and then refine the regulations before final promulgation of details. 
Provisions are flexible and easy to push through. However, there is usually a time gap 
between the provisions and the final regulations. Some important provisions issued in 
the recent years which are still waiting for final legislation include: 
The Tentative Provisions on the Use of Foreign Investment in Construction of 
Power Projects — March 1994， 
Several Issues Concerning the Examination, Approval and Administration of 
Experimental Foreign-Livested Concession Projects Circular (“The BOT 
Circular") - August 1995， 
The Provisional Measures on the Administration of International Project 
Finance - April 1997. 
The BOT Circular was jointly promulgated by the Ministry of Electric Power 
(“MOEP”)，the State Planning Commission ("SPC") and the Ministry of 
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Communication. It clears some of the major issues that affect the confidence of 
foreign investors in the investment in infrastructure projects in China. It sets out the 
groundwork for the standardization of foreign investors' involvement in the BOT 
style project structure. It provides a certain level of clarity to what had been an 
extremely opaque negotiation process. The BOT Circular explicitly lays down the 
central-level approval process required for pilot BOT projects and encourages 
competitive bidding for BOT projects. Nevertheless, the promulgation of the BOT 
Law has already been delayed for three and a half years by now. 
3. General principals set by NPC with supplements from legislative bodies 
thereunder 
Most of the laws adopted by the NPC are general in nature and are therefore usually 
supplemented by more detailed rules and regulations promulgated by the State 
Council or relevant ministries. Rules and regulations enacted by the State Council or 
other relevant ministries deal with specific matters, especially economic activities, 
and are applied nationwide. For example, the JV Law issued in 1979 was 
supplemented by regulations regarding registration of joint ventures and labor 
management by the State Council in 1980, and other detailed rules in the 
establishment and management ofjoint ventures in the years that follow. This strategy 
is intentionally used to allow for flexibility in long-term considerations and 
implementation. 
4. Decentralization of authority 
China's legal system values flexibility. The central government adopts a 
decentralization approach to enable local governments to apply its policies flexibly 
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according to local conditions. The authorities of law enactment, application approval 
and monitoring are entrusted to the local officials in major provinces and cities. 
An example of local law enactment is the preferential policy. After the State Council 
passed provisions for the encouragement of foreign investment in October 1986， 
many provincial and local governments issued similar regulations to give foreign 
investors more incentives. These local provisions cany a step further the standards 
adopted by the central government but are still within the general principle of 
encouraging foreign investment involving advanced technology or for the production 
of export goods. 
The above strategies enable the Chinese government to implement central policies of 
economic reform while allow for maximum flexibility for real life adaptation. 
However, they also create supervisory and monitoring problems which will be 
discussed in more details in Section IV. 
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CHAPTER III 
ROLES OF LEGAL E^STITUTION 
Having briefly divided the three stages of legal reform in relation to the economic 
development in China and discussed the characteristics of the legal framework, we 
will then move on to analyze the roles of China's legal system in the context of 
foreign investment to see how the system help to promote foreign investment, and 
hence, economic growth in the nation. 
Institutionalization of economic reform 
Legal reform in China is a top-down administrative-led process. Opening to the 
outside world made Mainland Chinese suddenly realized how far behind the rest of 
the world China really was. The Maoist concept of using law as an instrument of class 
struggle was no longer applicable. The task of creating a 'modernizing ideology’ to 
fill up the ideological vacuum after Mao became increasingly urgent. Listead of using 
abstract law and slogans as the basis for popular mandate to rule the country, China 
uses law as a key element of regime legitimacy to institutionalize economic reform 
(Come 1997). 
Law matters in China. The Chinese government views law as a tool that will engender 
social and economic changes. Law is considered a political instrument of the ruling 
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class to achieve the end - promoting the strategic interests of the state. The fact that 
the open door policy was written down in the Constitution makes the policy 
indisputable. To the Chinese government, law serves as a type of propaganda to 
promote its ideology and to protect the interests of the state. 
Protection ofproperty rights of foreign investors 
The economics of institutions uses the term property rights in a general sense to refer 
to the rights of an actor to use valuable assets under both formal rules and in social 
norms and customs (Eggertsson 1993). The economic relevance of property rights 
depends on how well the rights are recognized and enforced in the society. For the 
Chinese government, successful attraction of foreign capital involves the protection of 
the legitimate rights and interests of foreign investors. 
By ‘legitimate rights and interests', Chinese scholar Wang (1997) summarized as: 
“the investment made in China, profits gained, and other legal rights and 
interest, in accordance with contracts, articles of association, agreements, and 
so forth, compiled according to Chinese laws and approved by the Chinese 
Government, including rights for entry into and exit from China, the right of 
residing in China, and the right to business operation in order to undertake 
investment activities, and all types of intellectual property rights used as a 
form of nontangible investment instrument or provided for technological 
transfer". 
Through legislation, China pushes through legal measures to protect the property 
rights of foreign investors, mainly in three ways: (i) domestic legislation; (ii) 
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investment protection agreements signed with foreign governments; and (iii) laws on 
the protection of intellectual property rights and other investment in nontangible 
instruments. 
1. Domestic Legislation 
The Chinese government is aware of the importance ofprotecting the property rights 
of foreign investors. In Article 2 of the JV Law, the first foreign investment-related 
law issued in 1979, it is stipulated that the ‘‘Chinese government protects, by the 
legislation in force, the resources invested by a foreign participant in a joint venture 
and the profits due him pursuant to the agreements, contracts and articles of 
association authorized by the Chinese government as well as his other lawful rights 
and interests." 
It also stipulates clearly in the Constitution and other important laws and regulations, 
such as the BOT Circular, that the legitimate rights and interests of foreign parties to 
be protected by law. 
2. Investment protection agreements signed with foreign governments 
The Chinese government signs intergovernmental agreements and treaties to provide 
protection of foreign enterprises and individuals in China. So far, China has signed 
mutual investment protection agreement with more than 50 countries including France 
and Japan. Investment insurance agreements were signed with the United States and 
Canada. Double taxation treaties were also entered into with 33 countries. 
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3. Laws on the protection of intellectual property rights and other investment in 
nontangible instruments 
Intellectual property rights was a new concept to China. In order to be permitted to the 
WTO and GATT and be able to maintain the MFN status with the United States, the 
government has been putting a lot of efforts to protect intellectual property rights. The 
Trademark Law (1983)，the Patent Law (1985)，the Law on Technical Contracts 
(1987), the Copyright Law (1991)，the Decisions on Further Strengthening Protection 
ofIntellectual Property Rights (1994) are all examples of the government's efforts in 
protecting intellectual property rights through legislation. 
Reduction of transaction costs 
Transaction cost is the opportunity cost of establishing and maintaining internal 
control of resources. In other words, it is the cost of specifying what is being 
exchanged and of enforcing the consequent agreements fNorth 1993). 
For the past 20 years, the Chinese government has been working hard to reduce 
transaction costs of doing business in China. Undoubtedly, the business environment 
for foreigners today is much better than 10 or 20 years ago. If we use North's 
definition of transaction cost to evaluate the level of protection China's legal 
framework provided to foreign investors, we can see that there is great improvement 
in both the aspects of specifying what is being exchanged and enforcing agreements. 
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1. Cost of specification ofwhat is being exchanged in contract 
Starting from the JV Law, China's legal regime has been working hard to define and 
clarify issues relating to foreign investment. The laws and regulations define the 
foreign investment structures, their legal status, approval procedure, the rights and 
obligations of Chinese and foreign entities, and issues about financing, restructuring, 
termination and liquidation, etc. Administrative bodies such as the State 
Administration of Foreign Exchange ("SAFE") set out rules of specific matters like 
the foreign exchange arrangement. 
For example, the BOT Circular issued in 1995 explicitly lays down the approval 
process and requirements by the central government for BOT projects. After 
international bidding process, a concession agreement will be executed between the 
wholly foreign-owned project company and the relevant provinciaV municipal 
government. The project company will run the project with sole operational control 
during the concession period. At the end of the concession, it will transfer all assets 
back to the government without compensation. 
The BOT Circular encourages competitive bidding for BOT projects, thus enabling 
the use of a pricing formula which based on costs to the users, rather than on 
production costs and return to the investors. This allows foreign investors to analyze 
the risks involved and seek the required rate of retum through project bidding 
accordingly. In the case of a change in government policy which may induce serious 
economic loss to the investors, the BOT Circular allows room for tariff adjustment or 
concession period extension. While no financial guarantee and fixed rate of retum by 
the central government will be given, the state will guarantee foreign exchange 
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conversion necessary for the payment of principal and interest on project loans and 
the remittance of dividends out of China. 
The first two pilot cases under this legislation in the power sector are the 2 x 350 MW 
Laibin B power station in Guangxi Province, and the 2 x 350 MW Changsha project 
in Hunan Province. Both the projects received enthusiastic responses from foreign 
investors. As many as twenty-two consortia bid for the project of Laibin B. 
Ultimately a consortium consisting of Electricite de France and GEC-Alsthom won 
the project on what was widely considered to be an extremely competitive bidding 
price. This example of the BOT Circular highlights the importance of providing clear 
requirements and guidelines of doing business in China, which effectively reduce the 
transaction costs that would otherwise incurred by foreign investors. 
2. Cost of enforcement of contract 
Li terms of enforcement of contract, a series of arbitration law is in place. This 
consists oftwo sets of rules and institutions which are applicable to domestic disputes 
and arbitration of disputes relating to foreign economic contracts. The cases of the 
latter kind of disputes are governed by Civil Procedures Law，covering disputes 
arising from foreign trade and foreign economic relations. Litigation in relation to 
joint venture is nevertheless under the governance of domestic arbitration rules. 
Disputes relating to foreign economic contracts are administrated by two different 
units, the China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission 
("CIETAC") and the Maritime Arbitration Commission, both under the governance of 
the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade. The first predecessor of 
2 2 
CIETAC was Foreign Trade Arbitration Commission established in 1954, which was 
renamed with scope of workload expanded following Deng Xiaoping's open door 
policy in 1979. Ten years later in 1989，the organization was renamed to CIETAC 
with new set of Arbitration Rules in place. These changes, again, reflected China's 
desire to modernize its litigation practices in relation to foreign matters. 
China's efforts were successful. Chinese officials claimed that CIETAC had over 300 
cases from 22 countries pending, and CIETAC had become the world's second most 
active organization handling international arbitration disputes (Hunter, 1995). 
In fact, over the past years, the number of law offices and lawyers in China have 
increased substantially. Number of law offices increased 2.65 times from 3,131 in 
1985 to over 8,300 in 1997. Number of lawyers, both part-time and full-time, 
increased from 13,403 in 1985 to over 100,000 in 1997. Number of economic cases 
reached 360,224 in 1996 and 27,730 were foreign-related legal affairs. 
The Chinese commercial arbitration system is currently in the midst of reform and 
reorganization. One major challenge is the insufficient number of competent lawyers 
and arbitrators. The qualification standards for arbitrators set in the Arbitration Law 
are criticized as too open-ended. Besides, the size of most of the law offices in China 
is small with an average of 12, with quite a number of part-time lawyers. There is still 
a long way for China in the establishment of a viable and functioning dispute 
resolution system. 
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Catalyst ofchanges within the legal organization 
As North (1993) put it, it is the interaction between institutions and organizations that 
shapes the institutional evolution of an economy. While China undergoes institutional 
changes, the legal organization itself is also changing. 
First, the structure of the legal regime changed, both in terms of size and the power 
delegated. In order to supplement its inadequate legal framework, the Chinese 
government releases some of its power to the local governments and some 
administrative bodies to enact law. It is allowed for the local authorities to adjust 
central policies to fit in to the local markets. This expands the size of the legislative 
organization. Unlike Hong Kong, which has only one legislative organization ~ the 
Legislative Council, various government bodies in China are allowed to make law. 
Apart from the delegation of authority of lawmaking, approval of investment projects, 
under certain limits, are also in the hands of the local officials. Generally speaking, 
the economic and legal reform is a top-down process from the central to local 
governments. However, there are occasions when legislation or policies in the local 
level affecting those of the central. For example, the Company Law was issued in 
Shanghai first, then apply to the whole country. 
Local officials are held responsible for the economic development of the regions 
under their supervision. As a result, local officials sometimes put their interests prior 
to those of the central. This phenomenon represents a change in ideology within the 
Chinese communist party -- from protecting the state interests to protecting the 
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interests oflocal or individuals. As Zheng put it, economic development in China has 
given rise to localism and regionalism (1995). This change facilitates the rapid 
economic growth in many provinces and cities; on the other side of the coin, it 
intensifies corruption of officials and makes supervision by the central government 
difficult. 
Catalyst ofinformal institutional changes 
Law and policy are strongly linked. The Chinese government views law and policy as 
the means to achieve social and economic transformation. The government takes legal 
institution to constitute the basis of the sort of economic development they intend. Jn 
Deng Xiaoping's words, ‘socialism with Chinese characteristics' is what the 
government has been trying to establish in the country. As China adopts the open door 
policy, people in China began to change their view about their country, capitalism, 
and the westem world which was once described as evil by the Communist Party. It 
made Chinese realized how far behind the world China was. Foreign trading and 
investments bring in new resources, technology, legal and westem concepts that were 
alien to most of the Chinese. It is primarily through legislation that Chinese 
government effects the social changes in the society. 
One great change to the Chinese society is an increase in average income and living 
standard for Chinese people. GDP has more than tripled since 1978 and the number of 
people living in absolute poverty has been reduced 60%. However, not every Chinese 
is benefited by the economic reform. Despite the government's effort to develop the 
inland region, 82% of the foreign investment are made in the coastal provinces while 
Guangdong alone accounts for one-third of all foreign investment. There is an 
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unequal distribution ofwealth, leading to a migration of workforce from rural region 
to the urban areas. Corruption and avarice are common and the protest by students 
and workers in June 1989 was aimed as anti-corruption among the government 
officials. 
Chinese economic reform also produces unprecedented level of unemployment. The 
State Planning Commission estimates that 20 million pubic sector employees will lose 
their jobs over the next five years. Ten million state workers have already laid o f fo r 
unpaid. Millions more are underemployed and/or paid only partial wages. The 
national unemployment rate is estimated to be 10% and could be as high as 20% in 
Northeast China. All these, are the direct results of the launching of economic reform 
that leads to the restructuring of the state-owned enterprises. 
China's legal system takes an active role during the process of economic reform. It is 
through law that China institutionalizes economic reform and the policy of 
introducing foreign capital. The government uses laws and regulations to implement 
policies ofreform and to protect the state interests. Through legislation, China reduces 
transaction costs of doing business in China. It tries to protect the property rights of 
foreign investors. As institutional change is a dynamic process, there are active 
interactions among institutions, the legal organization and economic development that 
influence each other. The change of legal system induces changes within the legal 
organization in terms ofauthority and size. On the other hand, the informal institution, 
meaning the society of Chinese also changed. It is these changes jointly affecting the 
economic development of China. 
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CHAPTER W 
PROBLEMS OF LEGAL SYSTEM 
While the legal system assumes several important roles in the economic development 
of China, some weaknesses exist in the system which affect foreigners' confidence of 
doing business in China. Li this section, we will evaluate the legal system of China 
from the point ofview of a foreign investor/banker to see which aspects of the system 
require improvements. 
Incomplete legal framework 
While China's investment climate is improving over the past decades, the 
development of the legal and regulatory regime has not been able to keep up with the 
pace of economic growth. The legal system in China is characterized by the use of 
vague terminology and often has no set mechanisms for application, determination, 
enforcement or penalties. This leaves laws up to ad hoc interpretation of individual 
government bodies, thus providing little comfort to the investors. 
For example, although the Electric Power Law of the PRC (1996) touches on a 
number of areas related to China's electric power sector, foreign investors still find 
the contents leave many questions open. Certain aspects such as approval process and 
electricity pricing are not addressed in detail. While the Electric Power Law provides 
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that tariffshall include cost, “reasonable，，profit and taxes, it does not specify what the 
permitted components of recoverable cost will be or on what basis the "reasonable" 
profit will be calculated in setting the electricity price. Likewise, it provides little 
assurance that the Price Control Bureau will permit necessary tariff adjustment if 
costs increase. The Electric Power Law does not provide guidelines as to the breach 
ofpower purchase agreement between a power producer and an electricity grid. 
Overlapping of law and regulations is also a problem. The Chinese government 
realizes this situation and is trying to make remedies. For example, there are three 
contract laws in China: the Economic Contract Law, the Law on Economic Contracts 
Involving Foreign Interest, and the Law on Technology Contracts. These laws are not 
standardized in format and content. In March 1999，a new Contract Law substituting 
the three existing laws was approved by the NPC and will take effect from October 
this year. The new law is an attempt to formalize the rash of legislation and 
administrative decisions and includes for the first time a reference to oral contracts. 
There will be no distinction between foreign and Chinese signatories to contracts， 
unlike the previous laws. But uncertainties still remain over what will happen to all 
the existing contracts signed under the old hotchpotch oflegislation and regulations. 
Lack of transparency in approval 
Let us take the application and approval process of a power project as an example. A 
typical power project has to go through three main stages of approval processes: 
project listing, approval of the feasibility study, and approval of the final project. The 
project sponsor or the Chinese partner has to submit various documents for the 
approval of SPC andy'or MOEP at each stage. Numerous other permits, approvals and 
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consents must be obtained from relevant national, provincial and local government 
authorities relating to various issues including siting, construction, environmental 
issues, operating licenses, etc. In addition, government approvals must be obtained 
with respect to the ancillary infrastructure required to support new power projects. 
The convoluted process has protracted the project approval process. 
The Power Investment Provisions states that any foreign-funded project shall be 
approved by MOEP and SPC. However, some provincial governments are unofficially 
authorized to have the power to approve small projects with capacity under lOOMW, 
or with investment cost up to a threshold ofUS$30 million. Since the type and level 
of approval authority delegated to local governments varies from region to region, 
foreign investors are always bewildered and feel unsecured. 
Besides, many foreign developers find it difficult to gauge precisely how long it takes 
for each step of the approval procedure and at which stage their applications are. 
Because of the inadequate co-ordination among different government bodies, it is not 
surprising to have an application that was held for years. The classic case is 
Guangzhou-Shenzhen-Zhuhai Superhighway of Hopewell Holdings Limited. Ten 
years were spent on negotiations and obtaining approvals from various authorities 
before finalization and construction of the project. 
Political risk is also a concem. The “macro economic measures" adopted a few years 
ago to cool down the overheated economy has slowed down the whole negotiation 
and approval process of many projects because of tightened control over capital 
investment. 
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Lack of consistency 
One of the key risks posed to foreign investors and lenders is the change of 
investment policies from time to time. For example, at the end of 1995, the 
government suddenly announced the scrapping of import duty concessions for new 
infrastructure projects, which was to be executed on April 1996. Previously signed 
contracts were ceased to enjoy tax benefit at the end of 1997. This revoke of policy 
made many foreign sponsors who had projects under negotiation at the time to rush to 
conclude the deals before the end of 1997. As a result, according to IPR World Bank 
Report (September 1997)，foreign direct investment in the first half of 1997 ahnost 
doubled the corresponding period in 1996. 
Legal inconsistency also exists between legislation by the central and the local 
governments. It is a common practice of the central government to issue law in 
general terms and allow for detailed explanations from lower level of authority, as 
long as their explanations or enactment are consistent with the laws and policies ofthe 
central government. By ‘legal consistency', China is found to adopt a relaxed 
approach. It accepts consistency in "spirit" rather than in exact terms. Since 
decentralization of authority in China has given rise to localism and regionalism 
(Zheng 1995), local governments which sometimes put their interests prior to the 
policies of the government, may enact law and regulations which contradict to those 
of the central government. The conflict, according to Macdonald, Yashiro, Yoshida, 
and Kunishima, may due to the existence of "an inherent conflict between the central 
government whose objective is to undertake policies that balance the economic and 
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social development needs of China", and “the regional governments, particularly in 
the advanced coastal provinces whose aim is to promote local economic, and 
sometimes personal, needs via increased investment in local power, water, roads, 
ports and telecom." As a result, foreign investors are sometimes caught in an 
overlapping and contradicting legal environment. 
Legal inconsistency is also due to the multiple reporting system in China. 
Government agencies often are under the policy guidance of a central government 
ministry, but also answer to provincial or municipal authority. Without clear 
delineation of authority or detailed legal and procedural substance, these multiple 
reporting relationships complicate decision-making. 
Enforceability oflaw and contracts 
One of the key risks faced by foreign investors and lenders is the capability of the 
Chinese entities to honor contractual arrangements. 
For the infrastructure project sector and in other industries, the government 
encourages more domestic involvement from the Chinese side. Thus, foreign parties 
are often forced to play a passive role. Very often, investors are dealing with Chinese 
partners with little track record of bringing projects into completion on schedule, or 
meeting up to the standards as stipulated in the contract. So far, we are not aware of 
any successful lawsuit brought by a foreigner over alleged breach of contract in 
China. 
31 
Another example is the provision of guarantee from Chinese authorities. Over the past 
decades, local governments guaranteed many foreignjoint ventures a minimum retum 
on their investment in Chinese toll road, power and other infrastructure projects. This 
provides comfort to the investors and lenders that many investment and lending 
decisions were based on the guarantees. Nevertheless, the government prohibited 
guarantees to be issued to foreign investors since 1994. The government said that this 
practice was never approved by the central government in the first place and has since 
banned deals with this structure. Since then, the most foreign investors can obtain is a 
support letter or comfort letter issued by relevant government bodies, which has no 
solid undertaking. With those guarantees now in doubt investors may see contracts 
having the probability of going into default. 
Li fact, China's legal framework does not have a system that enables effective 
resolution of disputes, supervision of legal consistency and monitoring of any abuse 
of law and policies by Chinese authorities and officials. Judiciary is seen as a 
protector of state interests rather than an independent arbiter of disputes. The recent 
bankruptcy of GITIC proves this viewpoint. Compliance with applicable laws does 
not guarantee that contract will be honored. This severely undermines the willingness 





According to Chinese statistics, the amount of actual use of foreign funds for the first 
two months of 1999 dropped 9.54% to US$4.28 billion, comparing to corresponding 
period last year. This was a combination of the results of the Asian financial crisis, 
continuing decline in Chinese export, and the unclear picture of RMB. Another 
critical factor affecting foreign investors' sentiment is the bankruptcy of GITIC. 
Li fact, many foreign investors complain about increasing protectionism and slender 
profit margins. Over the past two years, the central government has ordered the power 
and telecom companies to buy local products and threatened to close down foreign 
joint ventures in telephone operating companies. Some foreign companies are leaving 
China and others are scaling back operations. Recent plans to open formerly closed 
industries, including telecommunications，insurance and banking, and to lift the 
informal "buy local” order are most welcomed by foreign investors. 
Regarding reform of the legal system, there is still a long road to perfection. Previous 
analysis in this paper points out that legal system in China assumes critical roles in the 
introduction of foreign investment and economic reform. Li order to sustain economic 
growth through the utilization of overseas capital and technology, China's legal 
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system requires further improvements. One major concern is legal supervision. GITIC 
incident highlights the lack of supervision by the central government to local 
activities. Decentralization of authority requires close supervision. Right now, China's 
legal framework does not have an effective supervisory system to monitor 
implementation and compliance of law and policies. China should do more to ensure 
enforceability of contractual arrangements and try harder to maintain the consistency 
of laws and policies. As Standard & Poor's writing about its legal criteria for rating 
PRC project financings (1997)，in terms of "enforcement of agreements, predictability 
of outcome of the judicial process, and judicial independence from the government, 
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